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机构地区:[1]江南大学商学院
出 处:《中国农业大学学报(社会科学版)》2014年第1期51-62,共12页Journal of China Agricultural University;Social Sciences
基 金:国家自然科学基金"考虑农户行为偏好的农产品供应链协调机制设计研究"(71371086)资助;"教育部新世纪优秀人才计划"(NCET-10-0458)资助
摘 要:面对农民合作社的现实发展困境,在充分考量我国农户社会心理的基础上,将公平偏好和强互惠倾向纳入合作社农户的效用函数中;构建了合作社农户的生产行为演化博弈模型,分析了不同情形下合作社生产规范的演化逻辑;然后通过数值实验演示了公平偏好、强互惠倾向、守规农户初始比例等参数的变化对合作社生产规范演化趋势的影响。研究发现,守规农户越强的不公平厌恶程度以及搭便车农户越低的内疚程度,越容易导致合作社陷入全体农户生产低质量产品的困境;守规农户的强互惠倾向有利于维持合作社的稳定性;初始阶段较大的守规农户比例、生产高质量产品较低的额外成本以及较高的质量价格加成系数都有助于合作社向良性的生产规范演化。Facing farmers cooperative'development dilemma, this paper incorporated cooperative farmers" fairness preferences and strong reciprocity into their utility functions, buih an evolution game model about farmers' production behaviors and analyzed the evolution of production specification under different circumstances fully based on the Chinese farmers'psy- chosocial. Meanwhile, authors demonstrate that factors such as fairness preferences, strong reciprocity tendency and initial ration of compliance farmers can tremendously affect production specification evolutionary trends through numerical experi- ments. The results also show that strong unfair aversion of compliance farmers" and weak shame of free rider farmers nega- tively result in cooperative' s falling into the dilemma of producing low-quality products; nevertheless, strong reciprocity tendency of compliance farmers is positively conducive to enhance co-production stability; additionally, the increase of the proportion of farmers in the initial stage of compliance, the reduction of additional costs for high-quality products and the improvement of the quality markup of price under certain conditions are all helpful for a healthier state of production specifi- cation cooperation.
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