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出 处:《西安文理学院学报(自然科学版)》2014年第1期53-57,61,共6页Journal of Xi’an University(Natural Science Edition)
摘 要:合作的进化源于多种机制,主要包括亲缘选择、互惠利他和组选择.本文在亲缘选择下,基于囚徒困境和雪堆博弈的收益矩阵建立相应模型,讨论直接互惠和网络互惠对合作进化的作用.并对不同类型的博弈促进合作进化的条件进行分析.文中采用了"生灭"、"灭生"及"模仿"三种不同的更新机制.分析结果表明,在亲缘选择下,基于囚徒困境和雪堆博弈的直接互惠和网络互惠在不同的条件下可以促进合作的进化.The evolution of cooperation is the outcome of a variety of mechanisms, such as kin selection, reciprocal altruism and group selection. In this study, under kin selection, models with reference to gains matrix based on the prisoner' s dilemma and snowdrift game are con- structed. The role of direct reciprocity and network reciprocity for the evolution of cooperation is discussed. The conditions of promoting cooperation under different types of evolutionary game are analyzed. We adopt three different updating mechanisms, "birth -death", "death -birth" and"imitation". The results show that direct reciprocity and network reciprocity based on the prisoner's dilemma and snowdrift game can promote cooperation under the kin selection.
分 类 号:O211.9[理学—概率论与数理统计]
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