解开“囚徒困境”的国际经济法律制度——博弈论方法和中国问题视角  

Resolving “Prisoner's Dilemma” in International Economic Legal System: A Game Theory Analysis from China's Perspective

作　　者：陈儒丹[1] 

机构地区：[1]华东政法大学经济法律研究院,上海201620

出　　处：《国际商务（对外经济贸易大学学报）》2014年第1期120-128,共9页INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

基　　金：陈儒丹主持的2012年度国家社科基金青年项目"WTO争端解决机制的申诉方利益取向与对策研究"(批准号:12CFX110);2013年度中国法学会部级研究课题"中国参加WTO诉讼模式改革CLS(2013)D228"的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：本文以博弈论中最基本的"囚徒困境"模型为理论出发点来描绘各国在经贸交往过程中的利益关系图景,试图说明为什么国际经济法律制度可以起到解决"囚徒困境",增进国际社会各个成员以及整体福利状况的作用。有鉴于此,具体到中国的对外经贸法律关系处理这一问题,应该意识到一个国家所扮演的多重利益角色,进而以一种更加务实的,更加积极的方式参与到国际经济活动游戏规则的制定过程中去。Based on the ＂prisoner＇s dilemma＂ model from the game theory, this paper means to describe the realistic picture of the interests relationship between countries in the process of economic and trade exchanges, and attempts to explain why the international economic law system could be able to resolve the ＂prisoner＇s dilemma＂ and to enhance the welfare of both the international community and individual members. Given this, with regard to China＇s dealing with this issue according to China＇s foreign trade and economic legal systems, it is advocated that we should be aware of the multiple roles a country plays and we should participate in the international economic game rule-making process in a more realistic rather than ideological manner.

关 键 词：国际经济法律制度 博弈论 “囚徒困境” 全球化 

分 类 号：D996[政治法律—经济法学] F012[政治法律—国际法学] F224.32[政治法律—法学]