互惠偏好对回购契约协调效果和决策行为影响  

The Effect of Reciprocity on Buyback Contract Coordination and Decision Behaviors

作　　者：林润辉[1,2] 侯如靖[1,3] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学商学院,天津300071 [2]南开大学中国公司治理研究院,天津300071 [3]南开大学泽尔滕实验室,天津300071

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2014年第1期85-90,102,共7页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点课题(71132001;70972085)

摘　　要：为剖析互惠偏好如何影响回购契约的协调效果以及如何动态影响成员的决策,针对回购契约基本模型,建立包含互惠偏好的扩展后效用函数,并采用控制实验的方法收集数据,对其进行了实证检验。与基于批发价契约的研究结果不同,互惠偏好改变了回购契约的协调状态。由于实验中友好关系的设定,供应商的决策达不到协调条件,因此零售商的订购量低于集中决策的订购量,供应链的效率不能得到提升。同时成员在决策时不再是仅仅追求自身的利益,关系的维持也成为了其交易活动的部分目标。To analyze the effect of reciprocity on buyback contract coordination and its dynamic effect on agents~ decisions,this paper established the extended utility function including the preference of reciprocity based on the model of buyback contract. Besides, controlled experiments were designed to test the above results. Unlike research results of wholesale price contract,reciprocity causes the failure of buyback contract. Supplier＇s decision did not meet the condition for coordination. Therefore, the retailer＇s order quantity is lower than the benchmark under centralized decision, which means the efficiency of supply chain could not be promoted. During the exchange process, participants not only purse their own interests, while the relationship is also part of their goal.

关 键 词：互惠 回购契约 供应链协调 社会偏好 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学]