不完全信息下的价格信号博弈:来自淘宝网的证据  

Price Signaling Game in the Environment of Incomplete Information:Evidence from Taobao.com

作　　者：周耿[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《当代财经》2014年第4期14-23,共10页Contemporary Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71002028)

摘　　要：利用淘宝网的交易数据,对网上购物过程进行两阶段分解,证实了我国网上交易市场的价格信号博弈收敛于分离均衡。这表明价格在信息不确定的环境下代理了商品的质量信息,对需求有着正面的影响。这种正面影响主要发生在购物初级搜索阶段,而在最终决策阶段,需求法则仍然有效,从而导致价格对需求的总体影响是负面的。区别于拍卖市场直接提高价格的机制,信誉在明码标价市场能间接促进产品的销售,强化价格的信号传递,而羊群效应对价格的信号传递有一定的削弱作用。By making use of the trading data from Taobao.com, this paper divides the online shopping process into two stages to conduct an analysis. The results confirm that the price signaling game in China＇s online market converges on separating equilibrium. This indicates that price which represents quality information of commodities in the environment of uncertain information has a posi- tive impact on demand. This positive effect occurs mainly in the first searching phase of shopping. However, during the final decision making stage, the law of demand is still effective, leading to the generally negative impact of price on demand. Different from the mechanism of direct price rising in the auction market, reputation can indirectly promote product sales in the price-clearly-marked markets and enhance the signal transmission of prices; while the existence of herd behavior may weaken the signal transmission of price to a certain degree.

关 键 词：不完全信息 信号博弈 两阶段决策 网上购物 淘宝网 

分 类 号：F162.5[经济管理—世界经济]