基于多指标博弈的核电施工企业安全投入研究  

An Study of Safety Investment of Nuclear Power Construction Enterprise Based on Multidimensional-game

作　　者：陈建光[1,2] 吕本富[1] 宁一伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学院大学管理学院,北京100190 [2]中国建筑第二工程局有限公司,北京100054

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2014年第6期97-106,共10页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70972104;71172199;71203218;71202115)

摘　　要：核电的发展离不开安全的保障,核电建设的快速发展使得核电建筑施工企业在市场竞争和项目施工两个方面面临安全投入策略的选择问题,基于此,根据多指标博弈理论构建了两个博弈模型,分别讨论了竞争条件下和施工监管条件下企业安全投入的策略选择,研究结果表明合理的安全投入将会使企业在竞争中占据优势地位,同时在施工阶段企业需要根据监管方的策略变化选择与之适合的安全投入策略,从而实现自身效用最大化的目的。Safety means a lot to the development of nuclear power. The rapid develop- ment of nuclear power construction makes construction enterprises faced with the choice of nuclear security investment strategy in two aspects of market competition and project con- struction. Based on this, we used the multidimensional game theory to constructed two models to discussing enterprise security investment strategy selection which the enterprise competitive conditions and regulatory conditions under construction. The results show that reasonably safe investment will enable enterprises to occupy a dominant position in the competition, and during the construction phase enterprises need to select the appropriate security investment strategy to meet the policy changes in the regulatory side, in order to achieve the purpose of maximizing their own utility.

关 键 词：多指标博弈 安全投入 最优策略 

分 类 号：F426.61[经济管理—产业经济] F426.23