政府监管、管理层影响和审计质量  

Government Regulation,Management Influence and Audit Quality

作　　者：刘霞[1] 

机构地区：[1]河北大学管理学院,河北保定071002

出　　处：《广东财经大学学报》2014年第2期54-60,共7页Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：教育部高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金(20090121110034)

摘　　要：基于2001年～2011年A股上市公司数据，以非国有企业为控制样本，运用D-I-D方法进行实证分析，结果发现：在监管规定实施之后，相对于控制样本，央企的审计质量得到显著提升；进一步分别分析统一聘用制和强制定期轮换制对审计质量的影响，发现这些规定均有助于提升审计质量。这表明国资委的监管目的得以实现，限制管理层的影响有助于提升审计独立性。Using China＇s A-stock data from 2001 to 2011 and non-SOEs as a control sample, and emplo- ying a difference-in-difference design to examine the effect, the paper finds that the audit quality for CSOEs relative to other companies improves after the enactment of these rules. It further analyzes the effect of man- datory auditor designation and restriction on auditor tenure, and finds that those requirements have contribu- ted to audit quality improvement. It then provides evidences that SASAC＇s regulation aim has been succee- ded, suggesting that limiting management influence over auditors helps to improve auditor independence.

关 键 词：审计质量 审计独立性 政府监管 中央企业 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学] F224[经济管理—国民经济]