我国上市公司股权激励公告日的时机选择  

The Timing of Public Disclosure of Equity Incentive Plans by China Listed Companies

作　　者：祝昱丰 陶亚民[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《经济数学》2014年第1期69-73,共5页Journal of Quantitative Economics

摘　　要：本文选取了2008年1月1日至2012年12月31日间首次进行股权激励草案公告的245家A股上市公司作为研究对象,运用事件研究法对上市公司公告股权激励草案前后的超额收益情况进行检验.研究发现:即使不考虑股权激励本身带来的短期市场效应,草案公告日也更可能出现在股价低点,说明管理层会对草案公告的时机进行选择.进一步的研究则表明管理层是利用了自身对于公司季度盈余报告的信息优势来进行草案公告日的选择.This article selected 245 listed companies in China which disclosed an equity incentive plan between January 2008 and December 2012 for the first time. Event study methodology was used in testing the average cumulative abnormal re- turn around the disclosure. The result shows that, even without regard to the short-term market effect of an equity incentive plan, the public disclosure of the plan was more likely to appear at the bottom of the stock price, indicating that the timing was well chosen by the management board. Further study indicates that the management board would choose the public disclosure date by using their superiority in earnings information.

关 键 词：股权激励 机会主义行为 时机选择 盈余报告 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]