激励与约束:国有商业银行信贷管理制度分析  

Incentive and Constraint: Analysis on the Credit Management System of State-owned Commercial Banks

作　　者：高晓红[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济金融学院,陕西西安710061

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2001年第2期66-73,共8页Modern Economic Science

摘　　要：对于银行而言 ,其经营中所面临的道德风险不仅来源于借款企业 ,更重要、更直接的是其信贷人员的“败德行为”问题。我国国有商业银行传统的信贷管理制度未能对信贷人员的代理行为形成有效的约束 ,从而导致了大量银行坏帐的产生。现有的信贷管理制度又过度强调了对风险的防范 ,从而又在很大程度上约束了银行的开拓经营和整个宏观经济的平稳快速发展。本文对此运用契约经济理论分析了我国国有商业银行传统及现有信贷管理制度对信贷人员所做的契约安排及其存在的问题 。Because the credit manager controls the funds which have been made available to outside sources, the moral hazard of the credit managers may be more dangerous than the one of the customers to a commercial bank.There is no effective constraint to the credit in the Chinese traditional credit management systems,which result in the enormous bad debt and low quality assets of the state-owned commercial bank.But the existing system lay too much stress on the credit risk,consequently it has negative influence on the development of banks and the growth of the economy.To this question, this paper analyzes the contractual arrangement to the credit manager in the Chinese traditional credit management systems and the one in being with contract theory.Based on this,an improved design has been discussed.

关 键 词：信贷人员 代理契约 道德风险 激励 约束 避险 国有商业银行 信贷管理制度 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学]