农村面源污染治理中政府监管与农户环保行为的博弈分析  

The Analysis on Game between Government Regulation and Farmer's Environmental Behavior in Rural Non-Point Source Pollution Control

作　　者：杨丽霞[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江财经大学资源环境与城乡规划管理系,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《生态经济》2014年第5期127-130,共4页Ecological Economy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(41371188和41171151);教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目(11YJC630254);浙江省哲学社会科学规划项目项(12JCGL19YB)阶段性成果

摘　　要：农村环境具有"公共物品"属性,致使追逐短期利益的农户不可避免地会采取"搭便车"行为,使农村环境治理陷入"囚徒困境",政府有效监管成为必然。文章引入农户间接的、非物质形态的收益和政府的政治成本,基于政府和农户治理农村面源污染的策略选择,构建政府和农户的博弈模型。结果表明:降低政府监管成本、增加政府的政治成本、加大政府对农户的技术支持、提高政府的补贴力度和农户环保技术的收益等都有助于农村环境的改善。由此可见,现阶段,政府应将农民合作组织纳入执行政府农村经济政策目标的组织体系中,发展壮大农民合作组织,同时政府应将农村环境和农民参与纳入政府绩效考评体系中,并增大其评价权重,确保对农村环境进行有效监管。Because of ＂public goods＂ attribute of the rural environment, the farmers who pursuit of short-term interests will inevitably take some behavior to free ride eventually so as to lead rural environment protection into so called ＂prisoner＇s dilemma＂. It is necessary for the government to have effective supervision. This paper introduces indirectly, non-material form of earnings from the farmers and political cost from government, and builds game between the government and farms based on the strategies selection. The results show that it is beneficial to improve rural environment by reducing the regulation cost, increasing the political costs and technological support, and raising government subsidies. Therefore, at this stage, the government should combine the farmer cooperative organization intQ the organization system of the rural economic policy goal from the government and expand farmer cooperative organizations. And the farmers＇ participation and rural environment should be brought into government performance evaluation system. Their evaluation weight should be increase in the systems so as to ensure effective supervision on rural environment.

关 键 词：农村面源污染 政府监管 农户 博弈 

分 类 号：F323.22[经济管理—产业经济]