考虑溢出效应的供应链合作创新演化博弈分析  

Toward an Evolutionary Game Model for Collaborative Innovation of Supply Chain in View of Spillover Effect

作　　者：李星北[1] 齐二石[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《北京交通大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第2期8-14,共7页Journal of Beijing Jiaotong University(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目"基于顾客行为的供应链协调模型与试验研究"(70971095);科技部创新方法工作专项"管理创新关键技术方法工具集开发与企业应用推广"(2010IM040300)

摘　　要：本文研究供应链系统中供应商与制造商合作创新的演化博弈过程,分析溢出效应、创新补贴在供应链企业合作创新中的影响,给出系统的演化稳定策略。结果表明:溢出效应促使更多的制造商选择"补贴"策略,加快了系统向稳定平衡点演化的速度;制造商的补贴虽然会促进供应商创新行为,但是过多的补贴也会使制造商对选择补贴的策略持消极态度;只有在一种情况下,即在没有制造商补贴的情况下,供应商依然能够通过创新获利,系统演化的最终结果才会是供应商选择创新,制造商选择补贴。This paper studies the evolutionary process of collaborative innovation of suppliers and manufacturers in supply chain system ,the effect of spillover and the influence of innovation sub-sidy in collaborative innovation of the supply chain enterprise ,and provides evolutionary stable strategies of the system . The results can be summarized in three points .First ,spillovers can prompt more manufacturers to choose subsidy policy ,and hence accelerate the rate of evolution of the system to the stable equilibrium point .Second ,although manufacturer’s subsidy promotes in-novation behavior of suppliers ,the excessive subsidies impose on manufacturers a negative attitude toward the subsidies policy .Third ,only when suppliers can get profit through innovation without subsidy from the manufacturers ,the final result of the evolutionary game will be that suppliers se-lect innovation and manufacturers choose subsidies .

关 键 词：溢出效应 演化博弈 供应链 创新 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]