存货质押融资业务中决策问题研究  

Study on Decision-making in Inventory Pledge Businesses

作　　者：黄莉[1] 王雅蕾[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆城市管理职业学院工商管理学院,重庆401331

出　　处：《物流技术》2014年第3期219-221,共3页Logistics Technology

基　　金：重庆市教委2013年度科学技术研究项目"动产质押管理信息系统研发与推广"(KJ131702)

摘　　要：采用Stackelberg博弈理论研究了核心企业回购担保下的存货质押融资业务中零售商与银行的决策问题。首先,根据质押运作流程构建出零售商与银行的预期收益模型,然后从博弈的角度分析了零售商的最优订购量,发现最优订购量与银行利率与质押率负相关,但是与回购率正相关,并给出了这些相关性的管理启示。最后分析了在已知零售商最优订购量的前提下,银行的最优质押率与利率的决策问题,进一步讨论出银行的期望收益与利率、回购率成正相关的管理意义。In this paper, we used the Stackelberg game theory to study the decision-making of the retailers and banks in the inventory pledge businesses under the buyback guanrantee of the core enterprises. First, in accordance with the operational process of the pledge, we built the expected revenue model of the retailers and banks, then from a game perspective analyzed the optimal ordering quantity of the retailers, found that the optimal ordering quantity was negatively related to the interest rate and loan-to-value ratio of the banks and positively with the buyback rate, and then presented the administrative enlightenments of these relations. At the end, we further discussed the administrative significance of the positive correlation of the expected revenue and interest rate of the banks with the buyback rate.

关 键 词：供应链金融 存货质押融资 回购率 质押率 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]