具有动态奖惩机制的电费收缴策略及其算法  

An Electricity Charge Strategy and Algorithm Based on Dynamic Rewards and Punishment Mechanism

作　　者：李彦平[1] 俞丹[1] 徐岱岱 

机构地区：[1]沈阳大学装备制造综合自动化重点实验室,辽宁沈阳110044

出　　处：《沈阳大学学报（自然科学版）》2014年第2期119-123,共5页Journal of Shenyang University：Natural Science

基　　金：辽宁省自然科学基金资助项目(2013020144)

摘　　要：深入研究了具有动态奖惩机制的电费收缴策略,提出了单边线性惩罚与非线性收费、双边线性惩罚与非线性收费、双边线性奖惩与非线性收费、单边非线性惩罚与线性收费、双边非线性奖惩与近线性收费等多种电费收缴模式.这种电费收缴策略可化解目前由电力部门主导的固定分档电价机制所带来的收费分档和电力供需矛盾.最后,从Stackelberg对策角度,给出了确定期望用电量的原则及方法,以及用户最佳用电原则及其电价算法.An electricity charge strategy is studied deeply with dynamic rewards and punishment mechanism. Several types of rewards and punishment are proposed, such as unilateral linear punishment and nonlinear charge, bilateral linear punishment and nonlinear charge, bilateral linear rewards and punishment and nonlinear charge, unilateral nonlinear punishment and linear charge, bilateral nonlinear rewards and punishment and approximate linear charge. This strategy can dissolve the contradiction between charging class and power supply-demand, which brought by the fixed class electricity price mechanism dominated by the power sector. Finally, the principle and algorithm of determining the expected power consumption is proposed from the perspective of Stackelberg strategy. Meanwhile, the principle of determining users＇ optimal electric activities and electricity price algorithm is proposed.

关 键 词：动态奖惩机制 电费收缴策略 用户效用函数 期望用电量 Stackelberg对策 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]