服务补贴与具有共同零售商的Stackelberg博弈研究  

Stackelberg game based on service subsidy and a common retailer

作　　者：王磊[1] 刘圆圆[1] 孙浩[1] 

机构地区：[1]青岛大学管理科学与工程学院,山东青岛266071

出　　处：《合肥工业大学学报（自然科学版）》2014年第4期478-485,共8页Journal of Hefei University of Technology：Natural Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71202143)

摘　　要：文章针对由2个制造商和1个共同零售商组成的供应链,研究制造商的服务补贴政策对参与方最优定价和服务决策及利润的影响。结果表明:随着服务补贴系数的逐渐增大,产品的批发价格、零售价格逐渐增加,零售商提供的服务水平先增加后减少;提供服务补贴总是导致制造商的利润受损,仅当服务补贴系数分别满足特定的条件时,零售商利润和系统利润才能够增加;对于系统利润可行的服务补贴取值范围明显小于零售商可接受的范围,系统利润最优的补贴系数也明显低于零售商利润最优的补贴系数。因此,采用纳什讨价还价模型对服务补贴政策带来的额外利润进行分配,使双方的利润都得到了增加。T he influence of service subsidy policy of the manufacturer on the optimal price ,the service decision and the profit of the parties in a supply chain composed of two manufacturers and a common retailer is studied .The results show that the wholesaling price and retailing price both increase with the service subsidy coefficient ,and the service level of the retailer increases before decreases .Provi-ding service subsidy always harms the manufacturer’s profit .Only if the service subsidy coefficient satisfies certain conditions respectively ,can the retailer’s profit and the system profit increase .The scope of the feasible service subsidy for the system profit is much smaller than the scope that the re-tailer can accept .And the service subsidy coefficient for the optimal system profit is significantly low-er than that for the optimal retailer’s profit .So the Nash bargaining model is used to allocate the ex-tra profit w hich is brought by the service subsidy policy to increase the manufacturer ’s profit and the retailer’s profit .

关 键 词：供应链 服务补贴 斯塔克尔博格博弈 纳什讨价还价模型 

分 类 号：F713[经济管理—产业经济]