论劳动收入分配政策的有效性——以中国制造业为例的定量分析  

On the Effectiveness of Labor Income Share Enhancing Policy:A Quantitative Analysis on China's Manufacture Sector

作　　者：钱震杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学金融学院,北京100029

出　　处：《金融研究》2014年第4期192-206,共15页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目"我国劳动收入比重偏低的原因和有效提高途径研究"(批准号:12CJY015)的阶段性研究成果;对外经济贸易大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(批准号:CXTD4-03);国家自然科学基金(批准号71003059)的资助

摘　　要：本文研究提高劳动收入份额的政策有效性问题,重点讨论增强市场竞争和劳动者议价权两个政策方向。研究表明,它们对劳动收入份额的影响由市场竞争水平、劳动者议价权水平、生产技术的劳动密集程度决定。数值模拟表明,当前提高市场竞争度和劳动者议价权对制造业总体劳动份额的边际影响分别为0.3和0.02个百分点,故提高劳动份额应以提高市场竞争度为核心而非提高劳动者议价权。This paper analyzes the impact of market deregulation and bargaining power of labor on labor share. We find that their impacts are determined by the level of market competition, labor＇s bargaining power, labor intensity of technology. Quantitative Simulation shows that the marginal effect on labor share in manufacture is 0. 3 and 0. 02 percentage points for market deregulation and bargaining power of labor. The conclusion is increasing market deregulation is more effective than increasing bargaining power in terms of labor share enhancement.

关 键 词：劳动收入份额 市场竞争程度 劳动者议价权 

分 类 号：F424[经济管理—产业经济] F249.2F224