审计师行业专长、经济依赖性与审计质量——基于审计任期的视角  

Auditor Industry Specialization,Economic Dependence and Audit Quality——A Perspective of Auditing Tenure

作　　者：李思飞[1] 刘恋[2] 王化成[3] 

机构地区：[1]北京外国语大学国际商学院,北京100089 [2]北京工商大学商学院,北京100048 [3]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2014年第5期112-124,共13页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目"家族企业传承的动因与经济后果研究"(12CG032)

摘　　要：本文以2006～2011年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本，检验在不同的审计任期下，审计师行业专长和经济依赖性对审计质量的影响。实证研究发现，在短期内，具有行业专长的审计师能够有效地提高审计质量；在长期中，当具有行业专长的审计师对行业内客户的经济依赖性增大时，审计质量将会降低。本文的研究结论有助于我们更好的理解中国审计师行业专门化战略与审计师强制轮换制度。Based on samples of Chinese listed companies from 2006 to 2011, this paper examines how auditor specialization and auditors＇ economic dependence affect auditing quality given different auditor tenures. The empirical results show that firms audited by industry specialists have relatively higher audit quality in short tenure, but audit quality will be weakened with the extension of tenure because extended auditor tenure may create negative economic incentives for industry specialists. These findings provide further un- derstanding on the effect of auditor industry specialization strategy and mandatory rotation.

关 键 词：审计师行业专长 经济依赖性 审计质量 审计任期 

分 类 号：F239.6[经济管理—会计学]