基于适应性选择密文不可区分性的抗辅助输入泄漏公钥加密方案  

Public key encryption scheme with auxiliary inputs based on indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack

作　　者：王占君[1] 马海英[2,3] 王金华[1] 

机构地区：[1]南通大学理学院,江苏南通226007 [2]同济大学计算机科学与技术系,上海201804 [3]南通大学计算机科学与技术学院,江苏南通226019

出　　处：《计算机应用》2014年第5期1288-1291,共4页journal of Computer Applications

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(61272424;11371207);国家科技支撑计划项目(2012BAH15F03);上海自然科学基金资助项目(13ZR1443100);江苏省高校自然科学研究项目(12KJB520015);南通市科技计划项目(BK2013050;BK2012026;BK2011070)

摘　　要：现有的抗辅助输入公钥加密方案仅满足选择明文攻击(IND-CPA)安全性,难以满足实际应用的安全需求。基于判定性Diffie-Hellman(DDH)假设下CS'98加密方案和域GF(q)上Goldreich-Levin定理,构造出一种新型的抗辅助输入泄漏的公钥加密方案。该方案满足适应性选择密文不可区分性(IND-CCA2)安全性,允许攻击者利用辅助输入泄漏信息攻击挑战密文时询问解密预言机。与BHHO加密方案相比,尽管加密/解密运算量都增加了近一倍,却实现了更加严格的IND-CCA2安全性。The existing public key encryption schemes Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attack （IND-CPA） with auxiliary inputs are impractical since they are only of security. This paper constructed a novel public-key encryption scheme resilient to auxiliary input leakage, which was based on CS ＇98 encryption scheme and Goldreich-Levin theorem over large field GF（q）. The proposed scheme was based on Indistinguishability under Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack （IND-CCA2） security, allowing an attacker to query decryption oracle with auxiliary input leakage when it tried to attack the challenge ciphertext. Compared with the BHHO （Boneh, Halevi, Hamburg, Ostrovsky） encryption scheme, the proposed scheme realizes the more strict IND-CCA2 security in spite of the encryption＇s and decryption＇s overhead being nearly doubled.

关 键 词：公钥加密 辅助值输入 适应性选择密文不可区分性 Goldreich-Levin定理 

分 类 号：TP309[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]