证实原则的认知逻辑分析  

An analysis on verification principle from epistemic logic

作　　者：郭美云[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南大学逻辑与智能研究中心,重庆400715

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2014年第5期9-13,共5页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：教育部人文社科一般项目"动态认知逻辑的基本理论及应用研究"(08JC72040002);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目"博弈中互动认知的逻辑研究"(SWU1309380);重庆市人文社会科学重点研究基地重点项目"动态认知逻辑的拓展研究"(11SKB16)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：证实原则作为证实主义的一个一般性纲领认为,一个非分析性的有意义的真语句都是可以被经验所证实(因而是可知)的。用认知逻辑表明从证实原则出发可以产生费奇悖论。费奇悖论表明,证实原则不仅和信念修正中穆尔语句不能被一致地相信相关,还与动态认知逻辑中一个公式是否总能成功更新有关。我们在对动态认知逻辑对证实原则的各种修正方案进行比较分析后认为,证实原则反映了人类学习和交流互动过程中的精致性和复杂性,这在动态逻辑的具体背景下可以进一步进行更为细致的研究。The verification principle, which is a general verificatianism thesis, says that every non-analytic, meaningful true sentence requires being empirically verifiable（hence knowable）. It shows that the verification principle may lead to Fitch paradox by epistemic logic. The Fitch paradox reveals that the verification principle not only concerns with Moore sentence can not be consistently believed in Belief Revision field, but also related to whether or not an epistemie formula can be update successfully in Dynamic Epistemie Logic. In this paper we analyze the different remedies on verifi- cation principle comparatively. We show the verification principle reveals the subtle and complex phenomena of human learning and interactive com- munication, which can be studied concretely and meticulously in dynamic logic setting.

关 键 词：证实主义 证实原则 修正方案 费奇悖论 动态认知逻辑 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]