中小企业与专利流氓专利策略选择的演化博弈研究  

Research on Evolutionary Game of Patent Strategy Selection of SMEs and Patent Trolls

作　　者：张健[1] 梅强[1] 李文元[1] 

机构地区：[1]江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江212013

出　　处：《科学学与科学技术管理》2014年第5期19-26,共8页Science of Science and Management of S.& T.

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(08BJL027);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(11YJC630105)

摘　　要：专利作为维系企业生存与发展的关键因素,成为企业竞争的重要战略资源。中小企业由于自身条件限制,其专利更容易受到外界的侵犯,亟需借助中介组织的力量维护专利权益。专利流氓的适时而生改变了中小企业依赖法律手段的"防御型"专利管理战略,扩大了其专利管理渠道。为研究中小企业专利管理策略选择的内在决策机制,借助演化经济研究工具,构建中小企业与专利流氓交往策略的支付矩阵,并对策略选择进行动态稳定性分析和数值仿真模拟,演示不同数值对演化结果的影响。研究结果表明:该演化系统收敛于两种状态,一种为理想状态,另一种为"不良锁定";针对"不良锁定"点找出相应对策,跳出"不良锁定",引导中小企业向期望的方向演进。Patent has become an important strategic resource of enterprise competition, as a key factor in maintain-ing the survival and development of enterprises. Owing to their own conditions, the patents of SMEs are more vulnerable to be infringed, and they desiderate the help of intermediary organizations to defend patent rights. Pat-ent trolls＇ emergence changes the ＇defensive＇ patent strategy that SMEs traditionally only rely on legal means, and expands their patent management channels. In order to investigate the inner mechanism selection of SMEs＇ patent, this paper built the payment matrix of SMEs and patent trolls based on the theory and method of evolution eco-nomics, gave dynamic stability analysis and numerical simulation of strategy selection. Based on a numerical simu-lation, the paper shows the impacts of different decision parameters and initial conditions on the evolution of results. The conclusions reveal that the evolution system converges to two types of patterns： one is an ideal status while the other is a bad ＇lock in status＇. By adjusting the decision parameters, we will make enterprises jump out of the ＇bad status＇ and lead them to evolve towards the expected direction.

关 键 词：专利流氓 中小企业 专利管理 演化博弈 

分 类 号：G306[文化科学]