我国企业投资区位决策模型构建研究——基于地方政府博弈的视角  

A Study on Construction of Location Decision Model of Corporate Investment in China —Based on the Perspective of the Game of Local Governments

作　　者：刘英基[1] 

机构地区：[1]河南师范大学公共政策与社会管理创新研究中心,河南新乡453007

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2014年第5期51-55,共5页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(13&ZD157);河南省教育厅人文社会科学重点项目(2013-ZD-060)

摘　　要：我国存在资源禀赋、环境规制、产业政策的区际差异,这些差异对企业投资区位决策会产生哪些影响?为了研究地方政府在兼顾地区经济增长、产业转型升级与生态环境保护中如何科学引导企业投资区位决策,文章构建了企业投资区位决策分析模型,理论分析了基于地方政府资源禀赋、环境规制和产业政策支持博弈的企业投资区位决策过程。并运用2005-2012年30个省级面板数据对理论模型分析结果进行了实证检验,实证与理论分析结果相符合。最后从增强区位禀赋优势、弱化区际环境规制差异、强化政府公共服务职能、鼓励企业技术创新提出了优化企业投资区位决策的对策建议。There are regional differences on natural resources, environmental regulations and industrial policies in China, what impacts will be produced by these differences in location decisions of corporate investment？ In order to explore how local govern ments scientifically guide location decisions of corporate investment on the basis of the growth of regional economic development, industrial transformation and upgrading, ecological environmental protection. The paper constructs a location decision model of corporate investment, and analyzes theoretically the process of tbe location decision of corporate investment based on the game of local governments for natural resources, environmental regulations and industrial policy support. Furthermore, it makes an em pirical analysis on the theoretical model by using 30 provincial panel data from the year of 2005 to 2012, the empirical results are consistent with the theoretical analysis. Finally, the paper proposes some suggestions to optimize location decisions of corporate investment from the following aspects： enhancing location advantages, weakening inter-regional differences in environmental regulations, strengthening the government＇s public service functions and encouraging corporate technological innovation

关 键 词：地方政府博弈 企业投资 区位决策 环境规制 

分 类 号：F124[经济管理—世界经济]