对两个基于身份签密方案的分析与攻击  

Analysis and Attack of Two Identity-based Signcryption Schemes

作　　者：张李军[1] 范佳[1] 

机构地区：[1]保密通信重点实验室,四川成都610041

出　　处：《通信技术》2014年第5期562-565,588,共5页Communications Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(No.61309034);中国电子科技集团创新基金(No.JJ120212)~~

摘　　要：2010年,Jin等人和Zhang在标准模型下分别设计了一个基于身份的签密方案,并且声称在标准模型下满足IND-CCA的保密安全性和EUF-CMA的不可伪造安全性。通过对这两个方案的安全性进行详细的分析,发现它们并不满足其所声称的安全强度。在严格的签密定义和安全模型下,明确地给出了对这两个方案的实际有效的攻击。最后,进一步分析和总结了这两个方案在其他常用的安全定义下的安全强度。JIN et al and ZHANG designed an identity-based signcryption scheme respectively in 2010, and claimed that they meet the IND-CCA security and confidentiality unforgeable EUF-CMA security in the standard model. However, after a detailed security analysis of these two schemes, it is found that they do not meet the security strength as it claimed, and this paper presents the real and effective attacks clearly under the strict definition of signcryption and security model. Finally, it further analyzes and summarizes the security strength of these two schemes in other common security definitions.

关 键 词：基于身份的签密 保密性 不可伪造性 安全性攻击 

分 类 号：TN918.4[电子电信—通信与信息系统]