关于人寿保险期交和趸交选择问题的博弈模型讨论  

Discussion on the Game Model of Choosing Pay Period or Single Premium for Life Insurance

作　　者：张聪[1] 宋少文[1] 

机构地区：[1]郑州大学商学院,河南郑州450001

出　　处：《保险职业学院学报》2014年第2期15-17,共3页Journal of Insurance Professional College

摘　　要：对于长期人寿保险,现有期交和趸交两种方式,对于保险人和投保人,两种决策对其利益有着不同的影响。在现实生活中,保险人会做出怎样的趋向性决策来增加自己当前利益?而投保人又会因此做出怎样的决策来保障自身利益的最大化?本文将以博弈论模型讨论两者间的关系。For long -term life insurance, there exists pay period and single premium for the insurers and the policy holders. These two ways have different impacts on their interests. In real life, what kind of decisions do the insurers tend to make to increase their current profits？ And what decisions will the policy- holders make to guarantee their own interests maximized？ This paper discusses the relationship between the two with the model of Game Theory.

关 键 词：期交 趸交 保险 博弈论 

分 类 号：F840.62[经济管理—保险]