On the Negative Effects of Trend Noise and Its Applications in Side-Channel Cryptanalysis  

作　　者：CAO Yuchen ZHOU Yongbin YU Zhenmei 

机构地区：[1]State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences [2]School of Information Technology, Shandong Women's University

出　　处：《Chinese Journal of Electronics》2014年第2期366-370,共5页电子学报（英文版）

基　　金：supported by the Nation Natural Science Foundation of China(No.61272478,No.61073178,No.60970135,No.61170282);Beijing Natural Science Foundation(No.4112064);Strategic Priority Research Program of Chinese Academy of Sciences(No.XDA06010701);IIE Cryptography Research Project(No.Y2Z0011102)

摘　　要：Most existing noise reduction methods in side-channel cryptanalysis treat all noises as a whole, instead of identifying and dealing with each of them individually. Motivated by this, this paper investigates the feasibility and implications of identifying trend noise from any other noises in side-channel acquisitions and then dealing with it accordingly. We discuss the effectiveness of applying least square method to remove inherent trend noise in side-channel leakages, and also clarify the limited capability of existing noise reduction methods in dealing with trend noise. We performed a series of correlation power analysis attacks against real power traces publicly available in DPA contest v2 from an unprotected FPGA implementation of Advanced encryption standard(AES) encryption.The experimental results firmly confirmed the soundness and validity of our analysis and observations.Most existing noise reduction methods in side-channel cryptanalysis treat all noises as a whole~ in- stead of identifying and dealing with each of them individ- ually. Motivated by this, this paper investigates the feasi- bility and implications of identifying trend noise from any other noises in side-channel acquisitions and then dealing with it accordingly. We discuss the effectiveness of apply- ing least square method to remove inherent trend noise in side-channel leakages~ and also clarify the limited capa- bility of existing noise reduction methods in dealing with trend noise. We performed a series of correlation power analysis attacks against real power traces publicly available in DPA contest v2 from an unprotected FPGA implemen- tation of Advanced encryption standard （AES） encryption. The experimental results firmly confirmed the soundness and validity of our analysis and observations.

关 键 词：Side-channel cryptanalysis Information leakage~ Noise shape Trend noise Power analysis attack. 

分 类 号：TN918.2[电子电信—通信与信息系统]