盈余质量对自愿性信息披露的影响及作用机理  

The Influence of Earnings Quality on Voluntary Information Disclosure and Mechanism of Action

作　　者：汪炜[1] 袁东任 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学经济学院

出　　处：《统计研究》2014年第4期89-96,共8页Statistical Research

摘　　要：自愿性信息披露是管理层对外传递公司价值,缓解信息不对称的重要手段,是强制性财务报告的有益补充。财务报告的盈余信息不但通过契约制定约束了管理层行为,其盈余质量也反映了管理层可信度并影响自愿披露的估值作用,这些都会影响公司自愿披露行为。本文以上市公司自愿披露的前瞻性信息为对象,分析了盈余质量对自愿性信息披露的影响及作用机理。实证结果证实了盈余质量对自愿性信息披露有契约作用和鉴证作用;契约作用表现为盈余质量可通过降低代理成本提高自愿披露水平;而鉴证作用体现在盈余质量为自愿披露信息提供了可鉴证性保障,提高了公司价值与自愿披露水平的相关性。This paper studies the influence of earnings quality on voluntary information in annual reports and its mechanism of action. By our case study, we use forward-looking information stand for voIuntary disclosure, and find the positive relationship between forward-looking information and earnings quality, and that earnings quality play a contract role and a verification role on voluntary information disclosure. Contract role makes earnings quality can reduce agent cost and then increase level of voluntary information disclosure. Verification role makes earnings quality can improve the correlation of firm value and voluntary information disclosure.

关 键 词：自愿披露 前瞻性信息 盈余质量 契约作用 鉴证作用 

分 类 号：C812[社会学—统计学]