企业融资约束、股权集中与创新效率互动关系实证研究  

Empirical Study of Financing Constraints,Ownership Concentration and Innovation Efficiency in Different Ownership Enterprises

作　　者：颜秀春[1] 陈春春[2] 徐懿[3] 

机构地区：[1]黎明职业大学经济管理系,福建泉州362000 [2]北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院,北京100875 [3]中山大学岭南学院,广东珠海519000

出　　处：《河北工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第1期23-31,共9页Journal of Hebei University of Technology：Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：福建省自然科学基金项目(2012J05132)

摘　　要：本文综合利用了Logit模型、主成分分析,以及DEA方法,通过构建动态面板数据模型,分析了中国制造业自1990年-2012年1790家上司公司的数据,实证了这些企业融资约束、股权集中与创新效率之间的互动关系,结果表明:融资约束和股权集中度对企业创新效率的影响因企业所有权性质的不同而存在差异。首先,国有企业出于"父爱主义"和"政治偏向性借贷秩序"的思考,使得其缺乏融资约束对创新效率的促进机制,而在民营企业中,融资约束对创新效率的正面影响则较为显著;其次,由于第一类和第二类代理问题的存在,在国有企业中股权集中度与创新效率负相关,而在民营企业中则表现为正相关;再次,不管是国有企业还是民营企业,企业的规模越大,其创新的效率也越高,这表明大企业在整合物质资源和人力资源方面始终具备优势;最后,考虑到国有企业的行业垄断背景,其利润水平不一定与创新效率挂钩,但是对民营企业来说,其利润水平却与创新效率联系密切。Via Logit model, principal component analysis, DEA method, dynamic panel data model, this paper has studied the data of Chinese 1790 listed companies in manufacturing industry since 1990-2012 and analyzed the interaction between financing constraints, ownership concentration and innovation efficiency. The results showed that the effect of financing constraints and ownership concentration on innovative efficiency vary from corporations with difference in enterprise ownership. At first, due to ＂paternalism＂ and＂ political pecking order＂ thinking, state- owned enterprises lack the mechanisms for financing constraints to promote innovation efficiency; however, in private enterprises, there is a significant positive impact of financing constraints on innovative efficiency; secondly, because of the first and second kind of agency problems, ownership concentration in state-owned enterprises is nega- tively correlated with innovation efficiency, while a positive correlation exists between the two variables in private enterprise. Despite difference in enterprise ownership, the larger the size is, the higher the innovation efficiency tends to be, which indicates that large enterprises always have the advantage in integrating physical resorrces and human resources. Finally, given the monopoly background of state-owned enterprises, the level of its profits is not necessarily related to its innovation efficiency. As for private enterprises, its profit levels are closely linked with its innovation efficiency.

关 键 词：融资约束 股权集中 创新效率 所有权 动态面板数据模型 

分 类 号：F42[经济管理—产业经济]