图灵机的神话:功能主义及相关论题的失败  

The Myth of the Turing Machine: The Failings of Functionalism and Related Theses

作　　者：克里斯.伊利亚史密斯 刘占峰[2] 陈丽[2] 

机构地区：[1]加拿大滑铁卢大学系统设计工程部哲学系 [2]海军工程大学人文社会科学系

出　　处：《哲学分析》2014年第2期118-126,共9页Philosophical Analysis

摘　　要：图灵著名的"通用机"的属性长期以来支撑着关于认知本质的功能主义直觉。克里斯·伊利亚史密斯认为,对可多样实现性的标准的功能主义论证有一个逻辑问题。这些论证实质上都依赖于图灵对计算的强有力的洞察。在处理了对这一批评的一种可能的答复之后,克里斯·伊利亚史密斯进一步论证了功能主义不是理解什么是具有心灵的一种有效途径。特别是他证明了在区别执行和功能时所涉及的难题会使可多样实现性无法检验,难以提供新的信息。因此,可以得出结论:图灵机在心灵哲学中的作用还需重新考虑。The properties of Turing's famous 'universal machine' have long sustained functionalist intuitions about the nature of cognition. This paper shows that there is a logical problem with standardfunctionalist arguments for multiple realizability. These arguments rely essentially on Turing's powerful insights regarding computation. In addressing a possible reply to this criticism, it is further argued that functionalism is not a useful approach for understanding what it is to have a mind. In particular, it is shown that the difficulties involved in distinguishing implementation from function make multiple realizability claims untestable and uninformative. As a result, it is concluded that the role of Turing machines in philosophy of mind needs to be reconsidered.

关 键 词：图灵机 功能主义 可多样实现性 计算的等价 心灵哲学 柯尔莫哥洛夫 

分 类 号：B152[哲学宗教—世界哲学]