隐瞒信息、寻租与保障房错配  

Information-hiding, Rent-seeking, and Public Housing Mismatch

作　　者：贾春梅[1,2] 葛扬[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学经济学院,江苏南京210093 [2]南京审计学院经济学院,江苏南京211815

出　　处：《河北经贸大学学报》2014年第3期42-46,共5页Journal of Hebei University of Economics and Business

摘　　要：审计署及部分省审计厅发布的保障性安居工程审计结果表明,部分不符合条件家庭"不应进却进""应退却未退"保障房,造成了部分保障房错配。在上述典型事实的基础上,厘清造成保障房错配的各影响因素,进而构建不符合条件家庭与保障房分配政策执行者之间的博弈模型进行不对称信息静态博弈分析,求解不符合条件家庭隐瞒信息或寻租行为与影响因素之间的定量关系。因此,为了提高保障房的配置效率,需要提高监管精准度、降低监管成本、加大处罚力度、压缩保障房利润空间等。The indemnificatory housing project issued by audit office and a part of provincial bureaus of audit shows that the part family is not conformity with the conditions of the affordable housing, caused part of security housing mismatch. On the basis of the above typical facts, the author clarify the influence factors causing the mismatching of affordable housing, and then build the game model between families does not comply with the conditions and policy executors of affordable housing distribution and proceed the asymmetric information static game analysis, and then solve quantitative relation between withholding information or the rent-seeking behavior of family does not comply with the conditions and influence factors. Therefore, in order to improve the allocation efficiency of affordable housing, we need to improve the regulation precision degree and reduce regulatory costs, increase penalties, and compress the affordable housing profit space.

关 键 词：隐瞒信息 寻租 博弈 保障房错配 瞄准失效率 安居工程 或有收益 纳什均衡 

分 类 号：F293.3[经济管理—国民经济]