动态竞争并购下的竞价策略选择和进入时机确定  

Bidding strategies and entry timing in the dynamic competitive mergers and acquisitions

作　　者：章伟果[1] 扈文秀[1] 安芮瑶[1,2] 景泽京[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,西安710054 [2]陕西省国际信托股份有限公司投资管理总部,西安710075

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2014年第5期1110-1121,共12页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70973096);陕西省高校重点学科专项资金建设项目(107-5X1202);西安理工大学校博士启动金(107-211304)

摘　　要：通过建立包含序贯进入阶段和竞价阶段的动态竞争并购模型,分析了不确定竞争环境和不完全信息条件下的主并企业竞争并购策略,重点求解了均衡状态下竞价阶段的最优竞价策略,序贯进入阶段后进入主并企业的进入决策、先进入主并企业的初始报价策略和进入时机.研究表明,先进入的主并企业可以通过抢占式报价阻止竞争对手进入并购竞争,且存在随机冲击的一段区间,使其可以单方并购目标企业.通过把模型扩展到进入顺序内生情形,确定了主并企业抢先进入的必要条件,并对主并企业的最优竞争并购策略及其相应的并购期权价值进行了求解.结论表明,抢先进入威胁将加速并购的发生,并且竞争主并企业之间进入成本差异越小,并购竞争越激烈.The paper investigates the acquirers＇ competitive strategies under the scenario of uncertainty and incomplete information by building the dynamic competitive M＆A model incorporating both sequential entering and bidding phase. The key points of the paper are the solutions in equilibrium for optimal strategies in bidding phase and the optimal entering decisions for the following acquirers, the best initial offering and entry timing for the leading acquirers in the sequential entry phase. The final results show that the leading acquirers can exclusively acquire the target through preemptive offer to prevent other competitors which may lead to a span of random shock. Through the extension of the model to the condition that the entry order is endogenous, the paper proposes the prerequisites for the acquirers＇ preemptive strategy and the solutions for the acquirers＇ optimal competitive strategies and the value of relevant M＆A options. The paper concludes that the threat of preemptive strategy will accelerate the realization of M＆A and that the less discrepancy of entering cost among acquirers leads to the more M＆A competition.

关 键 词：动态竞争并购 竞价策略 进入时机 不确定环境 不完全信息 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]