农产品生产商主导的分销网络博弈模型  

Game model of secondary distribution network led by agricultural manufacturer

作　　者：刘晓华[1] 梁雪春[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京工业大学自动化与电气工程学院,江苏南京211816

出　　处：《智能系统学报》2014年第2期192-196,共5页CAAI Transactions on Intelligent Systems

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(5120518);江苏软科学基金资助项目(BR2012043)

摘　　要：对农产品生产商在实际分销网络中处于弱势这一问题,建立以农产品生产商为主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,从而提高农产品生产商在分销网络中的竞争力。通过该模型可以得到,最优的农产品生产商延期支付策略和农产品分销中心订货决策,使得农产品分销网络各成员的利益达到最大,同时将农产品生产商的库存成本、固定产量及运输成本等因素考虑在内,为实际应用提供理论支撑。For agricultural manufacturer who have a disadvantaged position in the actual distribution network consid- ering the delayed payment of inventory optimization strategies and Stackelberg game strategy, the Stackelberg game model led by the agricultural producers was established, for the purpose of enhancing the competitiveness of the ag- ricultural producers in the secondary distribution network. This model optimizes the deferred payment strategy of ag- ricultural producers and the ordering decision-making strategies of the agricultural distribution network, which maxi- mizes the benefits for all the members of the agricultural distribution network. This model also takes into account the elements of cost inventory, fixed outputs and transportation costs, etc, providing the theoretical support for practical applications.

关 键 词：农产品生产商 分销网络 延期支付策略 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F323.7