政府支农专项资金审计的博弈分析  

A Game Analysis of Audit of Government Special Funds for Supporting Agriculture

作　　者：章新蓉[1] 程杰[1] 徐向丽[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆工商大学会计学院,重庆400067

出　　处：《江西财经大学学报》2014年第3期86-91,131,共6页Journal of Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"西部地区政府支农专项资金的投入方式及监管问题研究"(10XY039)

摘　　要：提高支农专项资金审计的成功率、防范舞弊是当前政府和社会关注的现实问题。通过对政府支农专项资金相关利益各方博弈关系的梳理,发现资金使用方和监管方合谋舞弊时,审计方审计的难度加大。为此,建立支农专项资金审计方、监管方、使用方三方的博弈模型用以分析三方的策略选择过程。博弈分析结果表明,降低审计成本、提高审计方的审计成功率,能够降低资金使用方与监管方合谋舞弊的概率;政府审计的独立性较弱,完全通过政府审计来降低资金使用方和监管方合谋舞弊的概率是很难实现的。因此,必须引入云审计、完善政府内部控制制度、通过政府审计部门的交叉审计及引入独立第三方审计等措施降低审计成本,提高审计发现舞弊的能力。How to increase the audit success rate of special funds for supporting agriculture and keep away fraud is a major practical issue currently faced by the government and the society.Through combing the relationship in the game among all sides whose interests related to the government special funds for supporting agriculture, this article finds that if fund user and regulators conspire to fraud, audit will become harder for auditors. Therefore, it constructs a game model concerning the three parties related to the special funds for supporting agriculture, i.e., the auditor, the regulator and the fund user, to analyze the process of their strategy selection. The results show that to reduce audit cost and increase the audit success rate can reduce the probability of conspired fraud between fund users and regulators; the independence of government audit is weak, so it is hard to lower the rate of conspired fraud between fund users and regulators completely through government audit. Therefore, in order to reduce the audit cost and improve the cability of spotting fraud through audit, the following measures must be taken, such as cloud audit, improvement of government internal control system, cross audit through the government audit departments, and independent third party audit.

关 键 词：支农专项资金 政府审计 资金监管 

分 类 号：F239.44[经济管理—会计学]