基于动态博弈分析的企业反倾销应诉“成本-收益”决策模型研究  

A Study of Cost-Benefit Decision-Making Model for Enterprises' Responses to Anti-Dumping Charges: Based on Dynamic Game Analysis

作　　者：刘爱东[1] 曾辉祥[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083

出　　处：《江西财经大学学报》2014年第3期109-119,132-133,共11页Journal of Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"我国企业应对反倾销的会计信息证据效力保障机制研究(71272068)";教育部人文社会科学规划项目"企业应对反倾销成本战略防护体系研究"(11YJA630058);湖南省哲学社会科学基金重点项目"应对反倾销的成本防护能力评价体系研究"(2010ZDB51);教育部高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金项目"我国企业应对反倾销的会计信息证据生成机制研究"(20130162110074)

摘　　要：反倾销涉案企业参与应诉与否或参与程度的决策,取决于应诉收益与应诉成本的权衡。基于动态博弈理论,建立不完备信息下出口企业应诉决策的动态博弈模型,量化应诉成本和应诉收益,构建了基于"成本-收益"理论的出口企业反倾销应诉决策模型,以出口产品价格和数量为标准,通过数理推导得出涉案出口企业应诉决策的5个临界点。可见,实现反倾销应诉决策的量化才是中国企业克服应诉信心不足、应诉败阵和构筑反倾销高效应诉机制的本原。The decision-making of enterprises involved in the anti-dumping charges concerning whether or not to give response or to what degree of participation depends on the tradeoffs between benefits and costs. Based on the dynamic game theory, this paper establishes a dynamic game model of the export enterprises' decision-making to give response to suits in the context of incomplete information. It quantifies the respondent costs and benefits and constructs a decision-making model for export enterprises to respond to anti-dumping charges based on the 'cost-benefit' theory. Taking the price and quantity of export products as standards, it works out the five critical points for export enterprises involved in the charges to make decisions through mathematical derivation. It is thus clear that to quantify the decision-making of responding to anti-dumping charges is the essence for Chinese enterprises to overcome the lack of confidence, avoid being defeated and build efficient mechanisms for responding to anti-dumping charges.

关 键 词：“两反一保” 反倾销应诉 “成本一收益”理论 出口企业 

分 类 号：F741.23[经济管理—国际贸易]