邻避型群体事件与事后救济型群体事件的博弈比较  

Comparison between NIMBY-Type Collective Action and Post-Relief-Type Collective Action from the Perspective of Game Theory

作　　者：梁罗[1] 王国婷[1] 任荣明[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学,上海200030

出　　处：《生态经济》2014年第6期22-26,共5页Ecological Economy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目"群体行为涌现机理及风险辨识研究"(11&ZD174)

摘　　要：从行动爆发的时间和民众维护权利的性质来看,环境群体事件又可分为"先预防型"群体事件与"后救济型"群体事件。文章引入"避型群体事件"来对"先预防型"群体事件进行研究。邻避型群体事件针对的是即将建设的邻避设施,而事后救济型群体事件反对的则是已经造成了严重环境污染的企业。这两类事件在诸多方面都有区别,尤其是博弈过程的不同,导致了政府在处置这两类事件时所扮演角色的差异。文章建立了动态博弈模型来描述两类事件爆发的原因,并针对性地提出建议和对策。According to the movement＇s outbreak time and the nature of right＇s maintenance, the collective action caused by environment pollutions can be divided into NIMBY-type collective action and post-relief-type collective action. NIMBY-type collective actions are against the upcoming construction of NIMBY facilities, while post-relief-type collective actions are against those enterprises which have already caused serious environmental pollutions. These two types of collective actions are different in many aspects, especially in the game process, which results in government＇s different roles of disposal. This paper describes the outbreak reasons models and comes up with specific proposals and countermeasures.

关 键 词：邻避型群体事件 事后救济型群体事件 动态博弈 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学]