官员腐败的经济学分析及对策研究——基于信号传递博弈模型  

The Economic Analysis and Countermeasures Study for Official Corruption——Based on the Signaling Game Model

作　　者：冯燕红[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2014年第9期37-43,共7页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

摘　　要：针对官员腐败现象,从经济学的视角出发,在信息不对称条件下展开分析,基于斯宾塞的劳动力模型弓l入信号传递模型的建立廉洁声誉信号博弈模型.通过分析,得出官员选择存在逆向选择问题的结论,并进一步研究了分离精炼贝叶斯均衡及其影响.在分离均衡范围一定存在的情况下,建立财产公示制度、加强监督、提高查处力度以及高薪养廉对策能配合模型系统地提高反腐效果.Against official corruption and from an economic perspective, this paper built the Probity Reputation Signaling Game Model based on Spencer＇s labor model under the condition of information asymmetry. After analyzing, a conclusion that there is adverse selection problem of officials in government departments nowadays was made. Further, this paper studied the separation refining Bayesian equilibrium and its impact. As a conclusion, we found that in the presence of certain separating equilibrium, these measures including property publicity report, strengthen supervision, increase investigation efforts and high salary can improve anti effect systematically.

关 键 词：信号传递 腐败 财产公示 

分 类 号：D630.9[政治法律—政治学] F224[政治法律—中外政治制度]