财政分权、地方财政赤字与土地财政  

Fiscal Decentralization,Local Deficit Financing and Land Finance

作　　者：吴正海 

机构地区：[1]西安市行政学院,西安710054

出　　处：《陕西行政学院学报》2014年第2期109-113,共5页Journal of Shaanxi Academy of Governance

摘　　要：基于地方财政赤字的视角,研究财政分权与地方政府土地财政策略的内在作用逻辑,通过理论分析发现:地方财政赤字激励了地方政府在利益觉醒后利用预算制度缺口,用"扭曲之手"来攫取预算外财政收益,进而驱动地方政府实施积极的土地财政策略来实现财政增收的政策目标。省际面板数据的实证结果进一步验证了财政分权、地方财政赤字对土地财政的正向驱动作用。土地财政的治理从深化分税制改革、改善地方财政收入结构、变革土地财政形成机制、完善行政绩效考核体制、加强预算监管等方面入手。From the perspective of local deficit financing ,this paper tries to ex-pound the internal logic between fiscal decentralization and local government ’s land fi-nance. Theoretical analysis shows that： fiscal decentralization in China aggravates local deficit financing, and the latter becomes an incentive for local governments to grab off-budgetary financial revenue, which will impel them to take active land finance strategy to increase local fiscal revenue. At the same time, our empirical test among them using provincial panel data shows that fiscal decentralization and local deficit financing both have obvious positive driving effects on land finance. Finally, we put forward a series of suggestions on land finance governance respectively from the following 5 aspects：deepen-ing tax distribution reform, improving local fiscal revenue structure, changing land fi-nance formation mechanism, promoting administrative performance evaluation mechanism and strengthening budget supervision.

关 键 词：财政分权 地方财政赤字 土地财政 面板数据 

分 类 号：F810.42[经济管理—财政学]