信息不对称下政府监管部门与食品企业的行为博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Governmental Supervision Departments and Food Corporations in Information Asymmetry

作　　者：张宏军[1] 李敏[1] 

机构地区：[1]河南科技学院经济与管理学院,河南新乡453003

出　　处：《湖北第二师范学院学报》2014年第4期72-76,共5页Journal of Hubei University of Education

摘　　要：在十八届三中全会的报告中,提出要转变政府职能,增强政府公信力和执行力,建设法制政府和服务型政府。政府监管部门与食品企业在食品安全的保护与监督上存在着信息不对称,二者的博弈影响食品市场均衡的形成。解决政府监管部门与食品企业之间的信息不对称,保障食品安全,应提高政府监管部门的执法效率,增强政府执法信号的传递,加强食品安全方面的信用建设,建立食品安全信息可追溯体系,构建食品安全信息发布交流平台。There is a game relation between governmental supervision departments and food corporations in the protecting and supervising food safety. Thus the game of both plays a role in the formation of food market equilibrium. For solving the information asymmetry between supervision departments of government and food corporations, ensuring the safety of food, the writer suggests improving the law enforcement effectiveness of government regulators, strengthening the signal transmission of government law enforcement, strengthening the credit construction of food safety, establishing the tracea- bility system of food safety information, and constructing the food safety information release platform.

关 键 词：信息不对称 政府监管 食品企业行为 动态博弈 

分 类 号：P34[天文地球—水文科学]