土地督察与开发商囤地:策略抉择的演化博弈  

An Evolutionary Game Theory Analysis on Land Supervision and Land Speculation

作　　者：鲍海君[1,2] 袁定欢 庄红梅[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江财经大学工商管理学院,浙江杭州310018 [2]国土资源部资源环境承载力评价重点实验室,北京101149

出　　处：《中国土地科学》2014年第2期29-36,67,共9页China Land Science

基　　金：国土资源部资源环境承载力评价重点实验室开放课题(CCA2012.03);2012年度浙江省钱江人才计划项目(QJ2012C19);国家自然科学基金(41371187);浙江省自然科学基金(LYBD010004)

摘　　要：研究目的:探讨土地督察员与开发商囤地的博弈行为及其管制策略。研究方法:演化博弈论方法。研究结果:构建了土地督察员与开发商囤地的演化博弈模型,论证了不同情景下土地督察员与开发商囤地博弈的演化稳定策略及其演化趋势。研究结论:在房地产开发领域的土地利用管制上,既要合理引导开发商等主体的市场行为,还要约束地方政府、土地督察机构等"监管者"的督察行为,构建开发商与土地督察员互动的土地利用管制机制,提高土地督察制度绩效。The purpose of this paper is to explore the behaviors mechanism of illegal land reservation by real estate developers and the state land supervision in China. Evolutionary game theory is introduced to probe into this problem. This paper argued that there are conflicts between land supervisor and real estate developers. In order to explore their strategies of evolution, this paper built an evolutionary game model of the real estate developers and land inspectors. The evolutionary stable strategies in different scenarios were proved through the analysis of the replicated dynamic equation between land supervisor and real estate developers. The recommend regulations were put forward in the end of the paper. The regulations of land use in the field of real estate, not only should guide the market behavior of real estate developers reasonably, but also should restrain the supervision behavior of the regulators. In order to improve the achievement of the land supervision system, it is necessary to build an interaction regulation model between the real estate developers and the land supervisors in China.

关 键 词：土地经济 开发商 土地督察员 囤地 演化博弈论 

分 类 号：F301.2[经济管理—产业经济]