不完全契约、敲竹杠与投资激励:一个文献综述  

Incomplete Contract,Holdup and Investment Incentives: A Survey

作　　者：刘清海[1] 

机构地区：[1]贵阳学院院长办公室,贵州贵阳550005

出　　处：《贵阳学院学报（社会科学版）》2014年第2期107-114,共8页Journal of Guiyang University:Social Sciences

基　　金：贵州省教育厅高校人文社会科学研究项目:"企业技术获取战略决策框架研究";贵阳学院校级科研项目:"企业研发外包战略的决策框架"阶段性成果

摘　　要：经典的GHM模型认为,不完全契约易导致敲竹杠问题,从而导致事前关系专用性投资不足问题。但是该模型是建立在很强的假设基础上的。通过对不完全契约的基础、声誉与敲竹杠行为、GHM模型的拓展、敲竹杠问题的治理机制以及实证研究等前沿文献进行了梳理,并指出下一步的可能研究方向。According to the classic GHM model,the realistic contract is incomplete and the incomplete contract will induce to the hold- up problem and under- investment. But the GHM model was built on the foundation of many strong assumptions. The paper summarized the frontier research literatures on the foundation of the incomplete contract,reputation and the holdup problem,the extended research on the GHM model,the governance mechanism of the holdup problem and the empirical studies. And then the paper put forward the further study problems.

关 键 词：文献综述 不完全契约 敲竹杠 投资激励 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]