信息不对称、抵押物与商业银行消费贷款经营行为--基于商业银行微观业务数据的经验分析  

Asymmetric Information,Collateral and Consumer Credit management Behavior of Commercial Banks:An Empirical Analysis based on Micro Loan Data

作　　者：李燕桥 臧旭恒[3,4] 

机构地区：[1]中国农业银行博士后科研工作站 [2]北京大学光华管理学院 [3]山东大学消费与发展研究所 [4]山东大学经济学院

出　　处：《南方经济》2014年第5期52-68,共17页South China Journal of Economics

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金面上资助一等资助“消费者行为变化与商业银行消费金融发展”(资助编号:2013M540174);教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目“建立扩大消费需求的长效机制研究”(批准号11JZD0016);国家社科基金重点项目“构建扩大消费长效机制研究”(批准号12AJY006);山东大学自主创新基金项目“不确定性下的消费需求研究”

摘　　要：本文基于国内某银行消费贷款业务数据,实证研究了信息不对称条件下抵押物对商业银行消费贷款经营行为的影响。结果表明:(1)抵押物能够显著影响商业银行消费贷款配给行为,提供抵押物的借款人获得的借款额度明显较高,且抵押物配给效果受信息不对称程度影响明显;(2)抵押物与消费贷款违约风险呈现显著的负相关关系,抵押物作用机制中的"客户选择"效应占主导地位;(3)抵押物决定与借款人事前风险评估无明显关联,但与借款人抵押物可获得性高度相关,表明银行业务经营中存在一定程度的抵押物依赖现象。Using the micro loan data from a commercial bank of China, this paper examines the impact of collateral on consumer credit management behavior under the condition of asymmetric information. The empirical results show that： （1） Collateral does influence the consumer credit rationing behavior, the borrowers pledged collateral obviously obtain more loans, and the rationing effect of collateral is affected seriously by the extent of asymmetric information. （2） Collateral is negatively related to the loan default risk, indicating the ＂ screening device＂ role of collateral is dominated. （3） The pledge of collateral is not necessarily related to the ex ante risk assessment of the borrower by the bank, but is truly related to the collateral availability of the borrower, also indicating a collateral dependence phenomenon in the consumer credit management behavior.

关 键 词：信息不对称 抵押物 消费贷款 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学]