演化博弈视角下农村信贷供给体系的构建  

The Construction of Rural Credit Supply System: Based on the Evolutionary Game Model

作　　者：乔红芳[1,2] 何金丽[3] 

机构地区：[1]闽南师范大学经济系,福建漳州363000 [2]华侨大学经济与金融学院,福建泉州362021 [3]天津渤海职业技术学院,天津300342

出　　处：《石家庄经济学院学报》2014年第2期16-20,共5页Journal of Shijiazhuang University of Economics

基　　金：闽南师范大学课题项目资助(SS09021)

摘　　要：农村金融供求双方在各自的利益驱动下会不断地进行博弈。基于演化博弈模型,构建了收益矩阵,分析得出:农村金融机构供给体系长期演化的均衡状态取决于贷款农户中高成功率的比重以及本土和外来金融机构贷款给高低成功率农户的相对利差;当不存在政策约束以及本土机构拥有灵活定价权的条件下,会实现完全由本土机构组成的ESS;在政策约束的现实下,目前的混合供给体系是无效率的,但随着农村劳动生产率系统性的提升以及金融创新的不断涌现会趋于形成一种有效的混合稳态均衡。Based on the evolutionary game model ,this paper constructs a payoff matrix of the two participants of the rural credit system .And it shows that the long-term evolutionary steady equilibrium of the rural credit suppliers de-pends on the weights of the farmers with a higher success rate and the relative loan interests when the local and for -eign financial institutions lend to the different farmers .When there are no policy constraints and local institutions can set price flexibly,the ESS of evolutionary game will be entirely composed of local institutions .However,under the policy constraints in the reality ,the present mixed supply system is inefficient .Along with the promotion of the rural labor productivity and emergence of the financial innovation ,the effective steady ESS of evolutionary game will come true.

关 键 词：外来金融机构 本土金融机构 农户 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学]