上市公司强制信息披露及监管措施——基于行为法经济学视角  

Mandatory Disclosure and Regulatory Measures for Listed Companies from Perspective of Behavioral Law and Economics

作　　者：吴秀尧[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国政法大学法和经济学研究中心,北京100088

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2014年第3期135-139,共5页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：当前中国上市公司强制信息披露法律体系和监管框架在内容、时间、方式、风险因素和监管措施五个方面存在问题,导致难以解决"行为利用"这种新形式的市场失灵,不利于保护以有限理性人和"新型投资者"为特点的中小投资者。对此,不仅应依据"基于偏差完善法律"的传统策略,还应依据行为法经济学视角下的"通过法律消除偏差"策略,以较为温和的"助推"式监管进行完善。The legal system and regulatory framework of China＇s mandatory information dis- closure of listed companies in terms of contents, time, formats, risk factors and supervision measures exhibits some problems, making it difficult to deal with this new form of market failure, i.e. ＂behavioral exploitation＂ and not good for protecting the minority investors characterized by bounded rationality and ＂new investors＂ in the real world. It should be improved by a more modest type of regulation, i.e. ＂nudging＂ on the basis of ＂debiasing through law＂ strategy from the perspective of behavioral law and economics as well as the traditional strategy of ＂improving law based on biases＂..

关 键 词：行为法经济学 上市公司 强制信息披露 

分 类 号：D922.29[政治法律—经济法学]