基于博弈论分析辛迪加贷款与我国中小企业融资难问题  

Analysis of Syndicate Loans and Financing of SMEs Based on Game Theory

作　　者：闫永晶[1] 李存金[1] 杨青[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京理工大学管理与经济学院,北京100081

出　　处：《科技和产业》2014年第5期156-161,共6页Science Technology and Industry

摘　　要：以青木昌彦的银行辛迪加及相机治理模型为基础,构建一种适合于中小企业的辛迪加贷款模式。该模式通过银行间的风险分担、消除银企之间的信息不对称,促进银行放贷的积极性,从而提高中小企业的贷款可得性。对中小企业融资中银企信贷关系的动态博弈分析,进一步表明辛迪加贷款模式对解决我国中小企业融资难问题具有重要意义。最后指出我国辛迪加贷款模式的发展还应该注意建立稳定的银企关系和加强对牵头行的激励。Based on the bank syndicate model built up by AOKI Masahiko, the paper introduces a syndicate loan model which is fit for SEMs. This syndicate loan model can increase the lending initiative of the banks and thus make loans easily available for SEMs. The paper then analyses the dynamic game of credit relations between SEMs and banks, which further indicates that this syndicate loan model provides a solution to the financing problems of SEMs. In China, as the development of syndicate loan is still in the infant stage, we should advert to some problems during the application.

关 键 词：辛迪加贷款 融资创新 信息不对称 动态博弈 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]