考虑专利许可的制造商与再制造商竞争策略  

Competitive Strategy for the Manufacturer and Remanufacturer Under Patent Licensing

作　　者：申成然[1] 刘名武[1] 熊中楷[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学管理学院,重庆400074 [2]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2014年第2期55-63,共9页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71303272;71302196)

摘　　要：研究了在专利完善市场受专利保护的原制造商面对再制造商竞争所采取得两种策略:无许可再制造与许可再制造。在再制造成本差异及消费者异质的情况下,分别建立了无回收数量限制的单周期模型和受回收数量限制的两周期模型,利用博弈理论求解原制造商和再制造商竞争情况下的最优决策。通过比较分析和数值仿真,讨论了不同参数对新产品和再制造品定价策略及双方利润的影响,并给出了相关结论。结果表明,原制造商倾向于采用许可再制造策略,这是在于原制造商可以通过收取专利许可费来分享再制造所带来的收益;而对再制造商而言,只有许可再制造所带来的节省成本足够高时,才有意愿接受原制造商的专利技术支持。In the patent perfect market,the original manufacturer by the patent protection can adopt two strategies： no license remanufacturing and license remanufacturing. Based on the remanufacturing cost difference and consumer heterogeneous,this paper establishes the single period model without recovery number limit and two period model with recovery number limit respectively. The optimal decision and equilibrium profit are given by using game theory. Through the comparative analysis and numerical simulation,the paper discusses the effect of different parameters on pricing strategy and the profit. The results show that the original manufacturer can share remanufacturing benefit through patent licensing fee in the case of license remanufacturing,so the original manufacturer is willing to adopt the strategy of manufacturer license; only when the cost savings is high enough in license remanufacturing,the remanufacturer will receive the patent licensing of the original manufacturer.

关 键 词：专利许可 再制造 竞争策略 博弈论 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]