B2C电子商务模式下供应链双渠道冲突与协调的契约设计  

Contract Design for Coordination of Dual-Channel Conflict under B2C E-Commerce

作　　者：赵礼强[1] 徐家旺[1] 王建明 

机构地区：[1]沈阳航空航天大学经济与管理学院,辽宁沈阳110136 [2]义乌市现代物流发展领导小组办公室浙江义务322000

出　　处：《工业工程》2013年第6期113-120,共8页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：教育部人文社科青年基金资助项目(12YJC630312);辽宁省优秀人才支持计划资助项目(WJQ2013004);教育部人文社会规划基金资助项目(11YJA630165);辽宁省社科基金资助项目(L12DJY053)

摘　　要：为了分析制造商通过传统零售商分销产品的同时开辟网上直销渠道,采取混合双渠道战略后引起渠道冲突的内在原因,如何通过合同设计实现混合双渠道冲突的协调,运用博弈理论建立决策模型,分析了混合双渠道的均衡策略。研究表明:制造商采取混合双渠道战略分销产品将导致制造商利润增加而零售商的利润减少,引起渠道冲突。为了解决双渠道的冲突并实现混合双渠道的协调,设计了基于电子渠道价格加批发价的合同实现了双渠道供应链的协调。同时通过电子渠道价格加二部收费合同契约实现了双渠道供应链的协调,实现了供应链成员利润的帕累托改进,从而解决了双渠道的冲突问题。In order to analyze the causes of channel conflict under B2C e-commerce where a manufacturer opens a direct Internet channel to compete directly with the traditional channel,a study is conducted on how to coordinate the two channels through contract design. A decision model is constructed based on the Game theory. With the model,channel equilibrium strategies are analyzed. Results show that,when a manufacturer opens an e-direct channel to have a dual-channel distribution system,the retailer＇s profit is reduced. Hence,the manufacturer＇s profit is enhanced and at the same time,channel conflict occurs. In order to avoid the channel conflict and coordinate the two channels,a modified contract of wholesale price is designed with e-channel price added by two-part tariff. In this way,the Pareto improvement of profit among the supply chain members is realized.

关 键 词：多渠道 电子市场 渠道冲突 供应链协调 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学]