地方政企利益捆绑生成机制及其化解策略--以新余市政府施救赛维LDK为例  

Research On Occurring Mechanism of Local Government Interest Bind with Enterprise——Take the Gaming Course of Xinyu Government Rescue LDK Solar as Example

作　　者：江永清[1] 朱欢[1] 

机构地区：[1]江西农业大学,南昌330045

出　　处：《中国行政管理》2014年第6期88-92,共5页Chinese Public Administration

摘　　要：地方政企关系问题是地方政府职能转变的核心命题。本文以江西新余市政府与赛维LDK太阳能科技有限公司的政企关系演变过程为例,通过解析双方利益捆绑的过程来揭示新时代背景下政府与市场的边界之争这个历久弥新的命题。研究发现,政府与市场之间的职能边界不是静止和明晰的,而是根据特定的区域和经济社会背景做出的一种不完善的选择。地方政府对于市场的干预往往因主动的政策引导而起,以被动利益捆绑而终。而企业的最终生死是取决于政府干预的意志和力度,还是取决于市场竞争激烈程度,往往后者控制着制高点。The relationship between local government and enterprise is the key issue for local government function transformation. This study from the angle of multiple gaming, taking the Gaming Course of Xin-yu Government rescue LDK Solar as Example, Analyzed their＇s relationship development progress until interest bind up with each other. It reveals that new Era＇s issue under the background of old problem between government and market, and find that the lines between government and market is not standstill and clear. Which is caused by actively guiding of government policy, and is comes out with interest bind up. The final result is determined by government＇s will or by market competition , the later maybe more powerful.

关 键 词：政府与市场 多重博弈 政策干预 利益捆绑 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学]