表见代理风险的规制  

The Regulation of Apparent Agency Risks

作　　者：曾新明[1] 

机构地区：[1]西华大学人文学院,四川成都610039

出　　处：《西南石油大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第3期79-83,共5页Journal of Southwest Petroleum University(Social Sciences Edition)

摘　　要：表见代理作为一种市场交易的虚像,在本人和相对人之间形成信息缺失和交流阻碍,带来了巨大的风险。运用法经济学的思维方法分析,可以确定在表见代理三方当事人中,相对人应负风险防范的主要义务;借鉴汉德公式,可以将相对人是否尽到"充分注意"义务进行量化。除相对人应负"充分注意"义务外,为防范表见代理风险,被代理人应加强自身的管理和制度建设,善意代理人应注意自身的代理权限,政府相关部门应进一步完善市场环境。As a marketable system of virtual image, apparent agency causes the lack of information and forms barriers to communication between the principal and relative person, and therefore, brings about great risks. Through an analysis from the perspective of economics and law, we determined that among three parties of apparent agency, the major obligations of preventing risks lie in the relative person. And by Hand formula, it is possible to measure the extent to which the relative person takes his obligations. What＇s more, to realize the regulation of apparent agency, the principals and good-intended agents need more self-discipline, and government departments concerned should further improve market circumstances.

关 键 词：表见代理 表见代理风险 表见代理人 相对人 汉德公式 

分 类 号：D923.6[政治法律—民商法学]