风险规避下具有促销效应的收益共享契约  

Revenue sharing contract for a risk-averse supply chain with promotional effect

作　　者：代建生[1] 孟卫东[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2014年第5期25-34,共10页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71102178);国家社会科学基金重点资助项目(08AJY028);中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(CDJSK100201)

摘　　要：在CVaR风险度量准则下,考察了销售商风险规避且存在促销效应下的收益共享契约,并从中获得一些管理启示.讨论了风险规避销售商的最优订购和促销努力决策.探讨了传统收益共享契约和改进收益共享契约的协调问题,分析了契约参数之间的关系,得到以下结论:在改进收益共享契约下,给定批发价格,销售商越规避风险,其收益共享比例和成本分担比例就越大.最后考察了促销努力效应和风险规避偏好对收益共享契约可行域的影响,指出促销效应和风险规避缩小了契约可行域,引入成本分担机制有助于消除促销效应对契约可行域的影响.Based on CVaR risk measure criterion, this paper investigates revenue sharing contracts （RSC） for a supply chain with a risk-averse retailer and sales effort effect, from which some managerial insights are developed. It discusses the retailer＇s optimal ordering decision and promotional effort decision. It explores the channel coordination issue via a conventional RSC and an improved RSC, and analyses the relationships between the contract parameters. It concludes that, when the wholesale price is given, the more risk-averse the retailer is, the bigger the ratios of its revenue-sharing and cost-sharing are under the improved RSC. Finally, it investigates the impact of the retailer＇ s promotional effort and risk aversion on the feasible domain of RSCs, and points out that both the sales effect and risk aversion reduce the feasible range of the efficient contracts, and the introduction of cost-sharing contract feasible region. mechanism helps eliminate the adverse impact of promotional effect on the

关 键 词：收益共享契约 促销努力 风险规避 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学] F274