伯川德竞争下考虑信息泄露的产品定价及利润研究  

Product Pricing and Profit Studies Considering Information Leakage Under Bertrand Competition

作　　者：李英波[1] 邱小平[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学交通运输与物流学院,成都610031

出　　处：《交通运输工程与信息学报》2014年第2期96-101,107,共7页Journal of Transportation Engineering and Information

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(10CGL013);高等学校博士学位点专项科研基金--新教师课题(20090184120018)

摘　　要：供应链中的信息对于供应链参与者各自的利益以及整个供应链的绩效都是有价值的。本文建立了一个供应商两个零售商的基本模型,就供应商是否泄漏零售商订单信息展开,给出了伯川德竞争环境下,不同均衡下的产品定价策略。在供应商最大化自己利润的前提下得出了一个信息非泄露价格区间。案例表明:收益分享率的提高可确保零售商在保证信息不泄露的前提下将产品定为高价,同时,信息保密区间存在条件下,收益分享率的提高会导致信息保密柔性降低。Information is valuable for the participants’ interests and the whole supply chain performance, it affects supply chain’s performance. A basic model, one-supplier-two-retailers’model, was constructed, taking the supplier’s choice of information leakage as the prerequisite. Different pricing strategies of products in different equilibriums were given under the situation of Bertrand competition; An unleakage information price region was derived under guaranteeing the maxmun supplier’s profit. A given numerical study illustrated that： first, under the premise of information confidentiality, the retailers’ high price setting could be ensured with the increase of the revenue sharing rate; second,if the information unleakage region existed, the confidential flexibility of information would decrease when the revenue sharing rate increased.

关 键 词：伯川德竞争 定价 信息泄露 供应链 

分 类 号：F252.2[经济管理—国民经济]