基于不同监管模式下的监事会制度研究  

Research on the Supervisor Board System of China's Commercial Banks

作　　者：邱兆祥[1] 刘国平[1] 安世友[2] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学中国金融研究中心 [2]对外经济贸易大学金融学院

出　　处：《国际金融研究》2014年第6期60-65,共6页Studies of International Finance

摘　　要：我国商业银行监事会制度虽然已经确立,但在实际工作中发挥的作用并不理想。在银行的公司治理结构中,监事会的功能时常被忽视。而从监事会内部看,我国商业银行监事会的监督工作普遍流于形式,行之有效的核心监督机制始终未能建成。本文通过对股东价值论视角下的监督机制模型研究,重新审视了不同监管模式下监事会在我国商业银行公司治理结构中的相关制度。在此基础上提出以下三点政策建议:第一,厘清商业银行监事会与独立董事之间的权力分工;第二,正确定位商业银行监事会的具体工作模式;第三,保持商业银行监事会的独立性。Although Chinese commercial banks have established the system of supervisor board, its function hasn＇ t been given full play. The role of supervisor board is often neglected in the corporate governance structure of these banks, while even from the perspective of supervisor board itself, its monitoring function is usually no more than a mere formality, with the absence of an effective core supervision mechanism. Building on the research of the supervision mechanism model from the perspective of shareholder value, this paper re-examines the rules related to supervisor board in the corporate governance structure of China＇ s commercial banks under different regulation modes. It summarizes the three major functions of the supervision mechanism model： first, clarifying the division of power between the board of supervisors and independent directors; second, providing intellectual support for the conservation of the independence of supervisor board; third, identifying the specific working mode of supervisor board in commercial banks.

关 键 词：监事会 商业银行 公司治理 科学定位 

分 类 号：F831[经济管理—金融学]