基于拍卖的垄断型产品供应链的博弈分析  

Analysis of the Game of Monopoly Product Supply Chain by Auction

作　　者：罗冬晖[1] 杨保建[1] 秦开大[1] 

机构地区：[1]昆明理工大学管理与经济学院,昆明650093

出　　处：《价值工程》2014年第19期21-23,共3页Value Engineering

基　　金：国家自然基金资助项目(71062006;71162019;71362025);云南省哲学社科基地重点资助项目(JD2011ZD07)

摘　　要：论文研究了基于拍卖交易的垄断型产品供应链中卖方和买方的博弈问题,成交价格同时取决于卖方向拍卖市场的供货数量和买方向拍卖市场的竞拍数量。博弈结果显示,在垄断供应的情况下,博弈的纳什均衡将会是买卖双方都不通过拍卖渠道来进行交易,只有在非常极端的条件下可以达成供货和竞拍等量的均衡。最后,论文引入一个新卖方作为买方参与拍卖后的补货来源,得到的新均衡解能使原买卖双方的收益提高,从而说明单纯的拍卖并不总是最好的交易方式,多渠道的销售方式有时更能保障买卖双方的利益。This paper studies the game issue of monopoly product supply chain based on auction, with the deal price decided by the seller’s quantity of supplying and buyer＆#39;s quantity of bidding. The result shows that under the condition of the supply monopoly, Nash equilibrium of the game will be the unwillingness of seller and buyer to trade by auction, or only in very extreme conditions can reach the balance of supply and the demand quantity. Finally, this paper introduces a new seller as buyer＆#39;s replenishment source after participating the auction. The new equilibrium can improve the profits of the buyers and sellers, which indicates that a single-channel auction is not always the best way to trade, multi-channel sales will be better in this case.

关 键 词：拍卖 垄断型产品供应链 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]