机构投资者询价制下主承销商声誉能帮助公司降低IPO抑价吗?  

IIs There Synergy Effect between Transaction Deposit and Loan Commitment in Banks Listed in China?

作　　者：何平[1] 李瑞鹏[1] 吴边 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院金融系 [2]华润深国投信托有限公司结构金融二部

出　　处：《投资研究》2014年第3期35-53,共19页Review of Investment Studies

摘　　要：在中国当前的询价制下主承销商没有对新股进行自主配售的权利,所以在询价过程中,参与申购的机构投资者将缺少激励去提供更加准确的信息,使得主承销商对于信息不对称程度高、价值不确定性大的公司的定价将更依赖于自身的定价能力。由于声誉排名高的主承销商的执业质量和定价能力更强,能够更准确的定价,因此本文提出假设并证明声誉排名高的承销商更能帮助不确定性高的公司降低IPO抑价程度,而对于不确定性低的公司,承销商的声誉降低IPO抑价程度的作用不显著。In China, lead underwriters cannot allocate shares to institutional investors at their own discretion, so institutional investors do not have strong incentive to report their information accurately. We conjecture that, without allocation discretion, lead underwriters should rely more on their own pricing ability when pricing companies with higher level of information asymmetry and uncertainty. Consistent with this conjecture, we show empirically lead underwriters with better reputation reduce IPO underpricing for those IPO firms with high level of information asymmetry and uncertainty but not for those with low level of information asymmetry and uncertainty.

关 键 词：信息不对称 IPO抑价 主承销商声誉 询价制 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]